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But Justice Florence Pang, who wrote the majority opinion, said it was too early to decide on that broad question because all three defendants who appeared in court were charged with assaulting police. There is no doubt that those who assaulted police that day acted with “corrupt intent”. But in her Jan. 6 sabotage incident, which did not involve assault, determining “corrupt intent” is much more complicated, she said.
“It would be wiser to delay addressing the meaning of ‘corruption’ intent until the matter has been properly presented to the court,” wrote Pang, a former Virginia state trooper who was convicted. It pointed to defendant Thomas Robertson’s pending appeal on January 6. Jury obstruction – as one potential means. Pang was appointed to the Court of Appeals by Joe Biden.
The stakes in lingering problems are huge. More than 300 of his January 6 defendants have been charged with obstructing the proceedings of Congress. Many of them have not been charged with assaulting police. Sentenced to up to 20 years in prison for obstruction, he’s a club sometimes used by the Department of Justice in plea bargains with mobs that stormed the most sensitive parts of the Capitol.
On Jan. 6, a task force ordered the Justice Department to indict Donald Trump for this exact crime after a federal judge in California agreed that Trump likely committed sabotage. urged to do so. A ruling narrowing the definition of “corrupt intent” could remove such accusations from the agenda.
Pang noted that previous cases have defined intent to corrupt in multiple ways. The Supreme Court has previously described “corrupt” conduct as committing “unlawful, immoral, depraved, or evil.” The late Justice Antonin Scalia defined “corruption” as “acts done to bring about either unlawful consequences or lawful consequences by some unlawful means”, which may include financial gain or damage to oneself or others. Having hopes or expectations for the benefit of a person. “
Bread’s 40-page opinion may not be the last word. Her second judge to join her sentencing — Trump-appointed Justin Walker — issued a concurring opinion that adopted a narrow interpretation of the definition of “corrupt intent.”
“The defendant must intend to get what he has earned. know is illegal,” Walker concludes.
Further complicating matters: Walker said his interpretation could be a binding opinion of the Court of Appeals based on precedent, requiring the most “narrowest” interpretation to prevail when the panel splits. (In a footnote, Pan said she disagreed.)
Defense attorneys for the January 6 defendants have already reviewed Walker’s analysis. Nicholas Smith, who argued the case on behalf of his three defendants on Jan. 6 at a December Court of Appeals panel, argued that if Walker’s allegations are correct, his “intent to corrupt” It said that the narrow definition was already the court’s binding opinion.
If the Justice Department concludes that the verdict was too questionable for Jan. 6’s sheer number of cases, prosecutors could seek input from all 10 members of the Court of Appeals.
The immediate effect of the Court of Appeals’ 2-1 vote is to reverse the decision of U.S. District Court Judge Carl Nichols, who held that the obstruction charge was improperly applied to the Jan. 6 defendant. However, Nichols’ decision did not analyze the “wrongful intent” aspect of the law. Rather, he argued, an obstruction charge requires proof that the defendant interfered with physical documents—computer files, papers, or other tangible evidence.
More than a dozen district court judges have dismissed that premise, arguing that the meaning of the obstruction statute passed in the aftermath of Enron is clear. Just falsify documents.
A panel of the Court of Appeals largely agreed with that interpretation, finding the majority of the district court judges correct. , agreed that it should be classified as an “official procedure” of Congress. But the deal ended there.
In a dissenting opinion, Trump-appointed Judge Gregory Katsas accused exposing advocates and protesters of all kinds to the possibility of harsh criminal penalties for routine protests or simply any form of lobbying. , accused the other two judges.
“Lobbyists who succeeded in persuading members of Congress to change their votes similarly influenced official proceedings. “Of course, this incident involves riots, not peaceful advocacy, lobbying, or protests. But the construction of [corrupt intent] The one my colleague adopted would wipe out all of the above. “
Under his colleague’s approach, Katsas said, demonstrators who have gathered outside the home of a conservative Supreme Court justice over the past few months in response to the Supreme Court’s decision to wipe out abortion rights have turned up to 20 people. He claimed he could face a year in prison.
Even Walker’s somewhat narrower interpretation states that “if a defendant knew he was committing an offense in a small way, he could overcharge 20 years of felony for relatively minor advocacy, lobbying, or protest.” will continue to do so,” writes Katsas. “But even that virtual protester is only protected until a legal scholar, neighbor, or police tells the protester what the law is.”
Walker’s interpretation of the law of obstruction still affords “incredible breadth,” writes Katsas.
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